1Corballis, 2010; Fitch, 2010; Hauser, 1996; Hurford, 2007; Seyfarth and Cheney, 1997; Tomasello, 1999.
2Dawkins and Krebs, 1978.
3Rendall et al., 2009.
4For a study of the waggle dance in bees, see von Frisch, 1967.
5Seyfarth et al., 2010.
6Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Origgi and Sperber, 2000.
7See also: Burge, 1993; Millikan, 1984, 2005; Recanati, 2002, 2004.
8Millikan, 1998, p. 162.
9A good example is offered by intention‐movements in nonhumans: see Tinbergen, 1952; Tomasello, 2008.
10Origgi and Sperber, 2000; Recanati, 2007; Tomasello, 2008.
11Krebs and Dawkins, 1984.
12These competences are involved in 1) inferring—as a receiver—the speakers' intentions and in predicting—as a speaker—the receiver's inferring abilities, 2) appreciating to what extent informational cooperation is beneficial or risky in a context, and hence, 3) exercising ‘epistemic vigilance’ to distinguish trustworthy, informed and benevolent informants from uninformed talkers or deliberate cheaters: Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Sperber et al., 2010.
13See Recanati, 2002, 2004.
14These ‘inferences in the broad sense’ are unconscious associations between nonconceptual (e.g. saturation of a schematic meaning) or conceptual representations (e.g. enrichment), but, in both cases, they fail to be truth‐preserving relations among propositions.
15Recanati, 2002, pp. 113ff., 2004; see also Pettit, 1987.
16See also Moore, submitted.
17Bar‐On, 2004, 2013, sect. 4.4. See also Green, 2007.
18Chaïken et al., 1996; Proust, 2014.
19Most routine communicational actions are generated, fully or partly by reinforcement, model‐free conditioning.
20Motivation in routine action is typically modular and short‐sighted, in contrast with motivation in strategic action. See Niv et al., 2006.
21In reactive control, agents respond to present imperative or recurrent events. In proactive control, agents prepare upcoming actions by planning them in more or less detail.
22See Dretske, 1988.
23For a discussion of the representational content of alarm calls, see Fitch, 2010, pp. 189–91.
24Rendall, Owren and Ryan, 2009, p. 235.
25Pika et al., 2007; the authors note that infant chimpanzees' gestures for begging food (palm‐up gestures) are indeed triadic, because the thing to obtain is indicated in the gestures. Gómez (2007) however, suggests that only protodeclarative gestures are referential.
26Povinelli and Giambrone, 2000.
27Seyfarth et al., 2010.
28See Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003, p. 41; Papworth et al., 2008.
29Schlenker et al., 2014. See a further discussion of these data below in Section 4.2.
30Auditory signals can be withheld or modulated in many species, including monkeys, ground squirrels and songbirds. See Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003, p. 41; Papworth et al., 2008; Papworth et al., 2013.
31Papworth et al., 2008.
32See the experiments by Crockford et al., 2012.
33Tomasello and Zuberbühler, 2002.
35Tomasello, 2008. For a defence of the claim that apes' gestural signals are rather based on a species‐typical repertoire, see Genty et al., 2009.
36Pika et al., 2007, p. 39.
37Attention monitoring is an important primate skill, crucially involved in subordinates' foraging decisions based on what the dominant chimpanzees can or cannot see: cf. Tomasello et al., 2003. For attention in the orangutans, see Call and Tomasello, 1994; for the gorillas, see Gómez, 2007.
39Osvath et al., 2008.
40Gruber and Zuberbühler, 2013. See also: Boinski and Campbell, 1995; Stewart and Harcourt, 1994.
41Stewart and Harcourt, 1994.
42Pika et al., 2007, p. 42.
43For a discussion of these two interpretations in the case of gestures, see Tomasello, 2008.
44See for example La Fontaine's fable The Crow and the Fox: ‘Mister Crow, good day to you. You are a handsome and good‐looking bird! In truth, if your song is as beautiful as your plumage, you are the Phoenix of this forest’. A highly strategic message, disguised as habitual greeting and felt reactive emotion.
45See, for example, Sperber, 2000, p. 118.
46For a detailed analysis, see Proust, 2013, 2014, 2015. Similar views are defended in Allen, 2013; Cussins, 2012; Scarantino, 2013; and Seyfarth et al., 2010.
47On non‐Gibsonian usages of ‘affordance’ in philosophy, see Dreyfus and Kelly, 2007; Scarantino, 2003.
49Millikan, however, did not try to characterize further the semantic content of PPRs, nor did she relate their dual role to their having a specific type of nonpropositional content. Gendler's aliefs, defined as ‘innate or habitual propensities to respond to a stimulus that are associative, automatic and arational’ (2008) are close to our two varieties of affordance‐sensings.
50Section 3.2 below will develop this point.
51See Proust, 2014, 2015. See also Dreyfus and Kelly, 2007; Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009; Zajonc, 1980.
52Barrett and Bar, 2009.
53Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001.
55See Gendler, 2008; Proust, 2015; Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009
56Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009; Pacherie, 2002; Proust, 2015.
57See Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2006.
58For example, chess players may select a move through an affordance‐based evaluation, in spite of having a number of beliefs about the present game configuration. See Proust, 2014, 2015.
59Seyfarth and Cheney, 2003.
60In particular Allen, 2013; Seyfarth et al., 2010. For a discussion of the continuum between emotional and referential calls, see Macedonia and Evans, 1993.
61Behrens et al., 2008; Heyes, 2012; Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Shanks, 2010.
62On this distinction, see Bates et al., 1975.
63Leavens et al., 1996; Tomasello, 2008.
64Leavens, 2004. A precondition for apes' declarative pointing seems to be a close emotional bond between the animal and his/her human caregiver.
65Véa and Sabater‐Pi, 1998.
66Macedonia and Evans, 1993.
67For a classical defence of an alternative nonpropositional semantics, where properties, rather than objects are represented, see Strawson, 1959, and its discussion in Proust, 2013. See also Adrian Cussins' nonreferentialist semantic proposal in Cussins, 2012.
68See Tomasello et al., 2003; Herrmann and Tomasello, 2006. For a different view, according to which chimpanzees understand cooperative pointing, see Russell et al., 2011. In our present framework, apes might be trained to sense a cognitive affordance even in a cooperative context.
69See also Leavens et al., 2005.
70Hand‐reared apes also easily pick from their caretakers the habit to point imperatively. See Tomasello, 2008, p. 34.
71See Leavens, 2004.
73Liszkowski et al., 2008.
74Kovács et al., 2014.
75For a general defense of domain general, ‘submentalizing’ processes, see Heyes, 2014.
76See also Sperber et al., 2010.
77Sperber, 2001. Sperber and Wilson, 2002, pp. 11–12; 2012, p. 269.
78Sperber and Wilson, 1987, p. 703; 1986/1995, p. 39.
79See Apperly, 2011, p. 87, for a similar argument, applied to mindreading: ‘A “mindreading module” is not an explanation for speed and efficiency. Rather, it presupposes that the task of mindreading can be rendered in a way that makes it tractable to fast, efficient computation’.
80Voiced in particular by Carruthers, 2011.
81See Koriat and Levy‐Sadot, 1999 and Schwarz, 2004. For an analysis of the general role of feelings in evaluation, and of the particular function of metacognitive feelings, see Proust, 2015.
82For the importance of activity‐dependence in metacognition in contrast with mindreading, see Koriat and Ackerman, 2010 ; and Proust, 2013, ch. 4.
83Koriat and Ackerman, 2010.
84Animals can reliably assess their performance even when no trial‐by‐trial feedback is provided, i.e. independently of any reinforcement. Furthermore, they are able to transfer their evaluative ability to a new task—say, from memory to perception.For a review of the relevant studies, and of the controversies about methodological issues, see Beran et al., 2012; Hampton, 2009; and Kornell et al., 2007.
85See Kiani and Shadlen, 2009. For more recent developments about the neuroscience of metacognition, see Fleming and Dolan, 2012. For the capacity of the brain to predict epistemic outcomes on the basis of patterns of dynamic activity, see Proust, 2013.
87For a review of the role of fluency in human metacognition, see Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009.
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